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Planning and Planner in a Post-positivist Global World: Towards a New Paradigm

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Abstract. Conventional planning, developed in the context of modernity, is in crisis due to post-positivist epistemologies and globalization processes, and requires a reformulation based upon a new understanding of rationality. In that context, Habermasian concept of communicative rationality offers a new point of departure for a new planning paradigm. However, the attempts to solve old problems do pose new questions and generate their own problems. What is suggested in this article is an open acknowledgement of the connection between planning and politics and continuation of the debate within a more diversified world of theory and practice.

Key Words: Planning; Positivism; Globalization.

Jel Codes: P11, P41.

1. Introduction

Planning has conventionally been associated with increasing human control over natural and social environment by employing rational methods. As Myrdal (quoted in Sagasti, 1988: 432) states "planning is essentially rationalist in approach and interventionist in conclusions." As a future-oriented optimistic process planning is generally related to the peculiarly human capability to think and act upon the environment in order to change it according to some deliberate objectives (see Chadwick, 1971; Alexander, 1986). The emphasis is put on the capacity of human agency and its power to change his/her conditions with sound knowledge. In that framework, the distinction between physical and social environment does not have much significance, or social and physical environment are considered in similar terms (Bailey, 1975: 5-6).

This is more or less conventional understanding of planning and it can be related to the epistemological and material conditions of the historical period called modernity. It is important to understand this connection between modernity and planning because, if the world is now undergoing a change towards a postmodern or global historical condition and new ways of approaching to ethico-political problems on the basis of a new

epistemological framework, planning needs to adjust itself into this new environment too.

In this context, I will first present the connection between conventional understanding of planning and “simple modernity,” with an emphasis on the concept of instrumental rationality. After this, I will focus on problems of conventional planning in a post positivist global world, leading to the so called “argumentative turn” in planning and public policy. Habermas’ communicative theory forms the most widely debated point of departure in the search for alternative planning paradigms. That is why the next two topics for this study are to briefly explain and critically assess Habermasian responses to the crisis of conventional planning. Finally, based on the critical assessment of Habermasian approach, I will attempt to conclude this article by calling for a broader understanding of planning and planner, with a particular emphasis on diversity.

2. Conventional Planning and Modernity

Planning has been more systematically applied in the 20th century. However, the roots and partial applications of planning theories can be traced back to the formation of the modern philosophy and the problems aftermath of the Industrial Revolution (Friedmann, 1987). As Giddens (1990: 177) underlies “modernity is inherently future-oriented [whereby] anticipations of the future become part of the present” in the spirit of a utopian realism. Becker (1932: 31) also observes the same tendency in the Enlightenment philosophy and states that “the philosophes demolished the Heavenly City of St. Augustine only to rebuild it with more up-to-date materials.” Thomas More’s Utopia, Tommaso Campanella’s Civitas Solis, Fransis Bacon’s New Atlantis, Abbe Morelly ‘s Code de la Nature are but a couple of examples for developing an ideal society.

This modern mode of thought is best reflected in its claim to universality and certainty as inherent in Cartesian rationality and its scorn for local knowledge as parochial and backward-oriented (Apffel-Marglin, 1996)[1]. The paradigm that feeds this new vision is largely borrowed from the

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[1] As Heidegger (1956: 89) puts it “the absolute certainty of knowledge which is attainable at all times is *pathos* and thus the *arche*, the beginning of modern philosophy.” It should be noted that Heidegger uses the term *arche* in its Greek

natural sciences –particularly from Newton's physics. As Hankins (1985: 9) observes the mood among the eighteenth century intellectuals, "the greatest hero of all was Newton." This paradigm created a new conception of nature, which was more or less "machine like," functioning in mechanical terms according to some mathematical formulations. This new understanding has almost deified the nature (Becker, 1932: 63). What was proposed was an empirical approach to nature, aiming at discovery of underlying unity of nature beneath the apparent heterogeneity.

The ideological background provided by the Enlightenment philosophy and Newton's paradigm for exact sciences finally culminated in the positivist approach to social sciences. That was a bold attempt to create a scientific philosophy, reducing everything to measurable reality after the model of the Newtonian physics. No basic distinction is made between physical and human reality in that understanding. There is supposed to be only one truth that we could reach or uncover, by employing the one and only dependable method of empirical science.

Modern way of thinking was also characterized by its futurity which meant basically a concept of quantifiable time to be mastered, manifested in clocks in daily life, career plans in biographies and plans for governments and corporations (Berger, 1984: 339-341). Modernity, or "simple modernity" (Beck, 1997), increased great hopes for posterity, which would make the best use of accumulated knowledge regarding nature and society, creating conditions for reconstruction of everything in a progressive manner.

The faith in the possibility of social betterment with the help of social science modeled after natural sciences has been "bedrock of modernity" from the very beginning (Wallerstein, 1996). Bauman (1991: 36) refers to this mood as "the philosophes' injunction concerning the need and urgency of the Kingdom of Reason," connecting it with the drive for 'social engineering' mainly emanating from the educated sections of society. Planning is closely related to these developments in social science[2]. Causal

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sense which does not simply mean a starting point which is left behind, but rather a starting point which pervades the whole later process.

[2] The connection between Marxist ideas and planning is more straightforward. Marx's ideas have been put into practice in socialist countries mainly through a central planning method. Whether real socialist experience was in line with Marx's original thought is a contested topic, and not relevant for our purpose. The connection between planning practices and ideas of other founders of sociology is less direct. However, one may argue that the connection is there. Durkheim, for

explanations in social science, particularly in the field of economic life, gained a widespread attention after the development of the positivist social science. Positivist epistemology has been dethroned in the philosophy of science, particularly after the Second World War, but "the ghost of positivism [still] continues to haunt social science in general and, it seems, policy and planning in particular" (Dryzek, 1993: 217).

The main agency to put scientifically based plans into practice was the modern state. Just like Plato's philosopher-king, it was up to the few knowledgeable people who were going to design the conditions for the multitude of population for human prosperity. The scientific knowledge regarding the social life, combined with the political power to transform the society, was the route towards a perfect social order. The example of statesmen-cum-philosophers like Turgot and Condorcet, their nineteenth century followers like Saint-Simon and August Comte, have been influential personal embodiments of this new understanding of politics as a technical or scientific affair. As Friedmann (1987) observes; Saint-Simon's social physiology suggested an image of the body social whose physicians would be scientists and engineers and it was their ability to predict future outcomes of present actions that would enable society to control its destiny.

The modern state is given the mandate to order society and transform it according to this modern mode of thought. As Bauman (1991: 20) states "rationally designed societies was the declared causa finalis of the modern state." Given the knowledge provided by the modern science and capabilities of the bureaucracy, the modern state could approach society as a "raw material" to be transformed into a better product. Here are the roots of elitist and state-centered characteristics of the conventional planning. This tendency got into its extreme forms under totalitarian political orders (both

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example, argued that the modern society is based upon organic solidarity and formulated a corporatist politics for bringing stability to modern life characterized by high level of division of labor. This corporatism (uniting the state elite with business and labor) provided a strong ground for corporatist planning. On the other hand, Weberian idea of bureaucratic rationality and search for efficiency on the basis of means-ends calculations touch to the essence of conventional planning based upon instrumental rationality. Unlike Marxist understanding, however, Durkheim and Weber did not consider a revolutionary change and they did not rule out the market as a corollary to planning. Thus, their ideas support not the central planning but rather planning in the context of a market economy, or "limited planning" as coined by Sartori (1987).

fascist and communist), which turned human beings into means for some seemingly sublime ends.

The sovereignty of the state over its population within a given territory has been "appropriated and transformed by the people into 'popular' sovereignty in the process of democratization since the 18th century" (Axtmann, 1996: 10-11). The source of legitimacy for the political authority was no longer divine but secular. One may argue that this new source of legitimacy also brought new responsibilities for the political authority. It was not sufficient to police the borders, provide internal and external security, but to be more responsive to popular demands. Combined with nationalist aspirations, the development of democratic welfare state created yet another motivation for planning as a tool for rational intervention (Myrdal, 1960).

3. Globalization and "Argumentative Turn" in Planning and Public Policy

As seen in the above discussion, classical conception of planning has been mainly premised upon instrumental rationality exercised by the modern nation state. However, this planning paradigm becomes problematic under globalization processes and changing conceptions of democracy. New conceptions of democracy and globalization processes do not necessarily eliminate of the state and instrumental rationality of the Cartesian self. However, they call for an end to their absolute dominance or monopoly. In that context, there is a demand for both horizontal and vertical enlargement of the boundaries of public or political. By a horizontal enlargement I mean going beyond the territorial nation state, without eliminating democratic politics at the nation state level. By a vertical enlargement I mean going beyond the limitations of the simple instrumental rationality. This is basically a demand for further democratization of the state and state/society relations.

Considering the universal/particular dialectic as a recurrent theme in the Western philosophy and political practice, globalization could be considered as another grand battle among these old concepts. In contradistinction to the simple characterization of the globalization as the triumph of the capitalist market and liberal democracy, a more complex of globalization refers to simultaneous processes of integration and fragmentation, homogenization and heterogenization, peaceful resolution of

old conflicts and new forms of conflict. Concepts like "glocalization" (Robertson, 1992) and "hybridization" (Pieterse, 1995) often used in the globalization literature emerge as a result of this complexity inherent in the globalization debate.

Globalization is not only free movement of goods, money, ideas and people, but also a new epistemological framework and unit of analysis for the social sciences. In a world more interconnected, and perhaps more important than this, aware of itself as more interconnected, some notions of classical epistemology and methodology lose their practical value or validity. Postmodern and post-structuralist debates, hermeneutic approaches and pluralist epistemological and methodological arguments become pervasive in that process.

Globalization, in this sense, does not mean construction of a universal logic for all humanity or the 'end of history' but rather a concept that refers to multi-layered, complex and relational world, where no single actor or rationality can assert a total domination over the rest. There is not a single universal self but various selves and various conceptions of selves, not the modernity but different modernities, not the rationality but multiple rationalities, and so on. The challenge, in this context, is how to reformulate democracy as a general framework for facing and preserving this diversity without falling back to extreme forms of relativism and violence. There is no easy and once-and-for-all answer to this challenge which entails permanent struggle in a world that is open to multiple alternatives, desirable or not.

What has planning to do with all these debates on globalization and identity/difference? State-centered planning based upon instrumental rationality and expert dominance is part of modernity in its "simple form." What is argued in this context is that as the general epistemological and material conditions change, or as the globalization or "reflexive modernity" processes outdate old forms of public and politics (Beck, 1997), planning in its traditional form becomes problematic and dysfunctional.

Are we going to abandon planning altogether and let the market take care of social problems automatically? Can pure market relations substitute for identity/solidarity issues and sustain the social fabric? Postmodernity and globalization debates are significant in terms of identifying the limits of social engineering based upon human knowledge, but how are we going to approach our practical problems of justice. Even the most radical postmodern thinkers are deeply concerned about such issues so far as

declaring, "if anything is deconstructable, it is justice" (Derrida, 1994: 36). The old planning may be dead but pure market relations do not seem to be the only answer for social betterment. As Durkheim observed long ago, "if interest relates men, it is never for more than a few moments" (quoted in Habermas, 1981: 116). What we need is not abandonment of planning as such but a new conception of planning adapted to this new environment. Bauman puts this tension or ambiguity concerning social justice and social engineering succinctly:

One can even say that prohibition of social engineering is itself a social engineering of sorts, once one knows (and we have such knowledge now) what consequences the 'natural' trends, if unattended and uncorrected, are likely to bring …Balancing of costs and gains of, respectively, action and non-action is not just an exercise in non-partisan expertise and dry, dispassionate accuracy, but a political decision between alternatives burdened with prospectless lives and dashed hopes (Bauman, 1991: 270)

It seems that the post positivist epistemology (in its different versions) and the "argumentative turn" in policy planning may provide us a new opportunity to cope with this challenge.

There is a visible effect of post-positivist (e.g., Thomas Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend, etc.) and reflexive modernity thinkers (e.g., Anthony Giddens, Ulrich Beck, Scott Lash, etc.) on planners of a new generation (Muller, 1998; Innes, 1998). Critical rationality based on self-reflection and rediscovery of the value of doubt vis-à-vis Cartesian certainty (Beck, 1997) sets the stage for a new debate on the possibility of a different planning paradigm.

From these debates on post-positivist epistemology and globalization one might conclude that under the new intellectual and material conditions facing the planners today, it is neither feasible for desirable to continue a planning practice based solely upon instrumental rationality, elite guidance and paternalist state considerations. As Fischer (1993: 21) observes, there is an "argumentative turn" in public policy and planning, which "emerges as much from larger political and institutional conflicts in society as from methodological issues." This argumentative or communicative turn in planning is not "idealistic," considering the practical experience of planners in complex societies and anti-democratic alternatives (Healey, 1993: 248). It is in that context that planning theorists, such as

Sandercock and Forester, developed planning theories that go beyond "simple modernity" (Beauregard, 1998: 94).

There are some communicative planning theories and models developed in that framework. Sager (1994), for instance, provides a comprehensive example for such models. In this perspective, planning problems can be solved in two contrasting yet complementary ways: one can trust expert judgment based on analytic techniques or discuss the matter and reach a group decision. These modes of problem solving are reflected in the dichotomy of calculation versus communication. The planners have to balance efficient goal achievement and democratic procedure. On the abstract level it is a question of bounding the domains of instrumental and communicative rationality in public planning.

Habermas' communicative action theory provides the broader background for the development of such planning models. This new planning paradigm develops mainly on the basis of a broader conception of rationality that is also relevant in a more interconnected and complex world, reflected in the diversification of the "social." That is why one needs to analyze Habermas and his contribution to communicative planning debate in a critical way.

4. Habermas and Communicative Planning

The use of Habermas' ideas is very prevalent in communicative planning debate. As Pensky (1995: 107) observes "the general area of planning and policy analysis is one of the most significant locations for the application of Habermas' critical theory." Particularly Habermas' concept of communicative rationality is considered as a very useful point of departure for a new planning paradigm.

As is already evident, in order to understand Habermas one needs to go into modernity debate to some extent. Habermas is mainly in the position of defending modernity against onslaught of postmodern critics like Paul Feyerabend, Michael Foucault, Jack Derrida, and Richard Rorty. Relativism and its political implications are the primary questions for Habermas (Bernstein, 1985: 4). He mainly criticizes particularistic and self-defeating character of postmodern arguments and stands for universalizing tendency of modernity, and thus, attempts to understand the Enlightenment and modernity in more complex terms (Fleming, 1997: 1-17).

Habermas developed the concept of communicative reason based on inter-subjectivity and a free and equal participation of parties to a dialogue. That is proposed as a way to reach consensus without resorting to power and violence. He defends "ideal speech situation" as a standard for rationality, which aims at "a consensus arrived at in a discussion free from domination" (Habermas, 1970a: 10). In that conception what is rational is not given prior to a dialogue but rather an end product based on the power of better argument in a real dialogue performed under suitable conditions.

A new classification of "knowledge-constitutive interests" underlies broader concept of rationality. There is a "technical," a "practical," and an "emancipatory" interest, corresponding to control of the world around us, understanding others, and freeing ourselves from structures of domination according to Habermas (Habermas, 1970b; White, 1995: 6). Technical knowledge is rooted in labor, uses empirical-theoretical tools to represent objective/physical reality, as employed in natural science; practical knowledge is rooted in language, uses interpretive approach, characteristic of social science; while emancipatory knowledge is rooted in power relations, uses self-reflexive and artistic approach, appropriate for critical thought (Fleming, 1997: 36-41). Communicative rationality draws particularly upon the practical and emancipatory sources of knowledge." Inputs from natural science, social science, art and personal reflection come across and interact in the process of a rational argumentation. The outcome is rational in a broad sense, as there is consent of capable participants speaking to each other in the framework of a "life world"[3] providing some common elements and shared meanings for communication.

Apart from the debate on modernity and its promises, one may also locate Habermas' approach into the post-socialist world of triumphant market ideology. In that framework, one may argue that the main problem for Habermas is how to reach consensus or manage/administer/order an unequal/hierarchical/class society that is, at the same time, based upon principles of freedom, equality, and individuality. In other words, the

[3] "Life world" is used by Habermas vis-à-vis "system," which is constituted by economic interests in the market and bureaucratic interests in the state. Life world goes beyond these systemic forces and provides some kind of a shelter for freedom. Individual experiences, family, small groups, neighborhoods, various types of civil society organizations, constitute the life world (Habermas 1981).

problem is how to reconcile modern state and capitalism with democracy. Adding new social movements (feminism, multiculturalism, environmental movement, peace movements and citizen initiatives) and growing interconnectedness and intermingling between different cultures and ethnic groups with globalization, the need for reconciliation becomes even more urgent. In that process it is getting increasingly hard to define society as a "Subject" with clear goals and interests. Neither the market nor the state elite is in a position to represent what is rational for a diversified society with open borders.

Dialectic between power and truth is part of dialogue among subjects of a conversation. However, when two human being start to speak they almost automatically use some validity claims embedded in the structure of language, which decide on the "better argument" beyond the differences of power and interest. Indeed Habermas seems to praise these validity claims as a ground to defend the weaker party to a dialogue vis-à-vis the stronger one. There are three levels or instances for the weaker party to raise objection to an undesired order coming from the stronger party. First, he or she may question the feasibility of a demand and show that the response to the order is practically not possible. Technical, objective, measurable or scientific knowledge plays a positive role in that case. Second, it is possible to object an order on normative grounds, on the background of legal and moral principles that bound the parties equally. Third, it is possible to question the sincerity of the party that has raised the order or request. In that case the weaker party focuses directly on the personal motivations of the party giving the order, calling for an emancipatory self critical analysis.

What is proposed by Habermas, in that context, is basically liberal conception of freedom of speech[4] operationalized through various institutional mechanisms (the parliament, the media, the courtroom, the academia, civil associations and movements, etc.), both formal and informal. However, the concept of public is enlarged to include informal networks of debate that provide the basis for formal legal decisions. That is what Habermas calls "discursive democracy" which is the interplay between "a multiplicity of 'public spheres' emerging across civil society and a broad spectrum of formal political institutions" (White, 1995: 13). "The very

[4] In his criticism of Habermas, Rorty (1985: 173) claims that "valuing 'undistorted communication' was of the essence of liberal politics without needing a theory of communicative competence."

concept of 'public sphere' is to do with rational-critical discussion" in a multiplicity of communicative avenues (McGuigan, 1996).

The idea of civil society is critical in that understanding of politics and public policy. Institutional core of civil society is; (a) a government which is limited and accountable, operating under the rule of law, (b) a market economy (a regime of private property), (c) an array of free, voluntary organizations (political, economic, social, cultural), and (d) a sphere of free public debate (Diaz, 1995: 81). Civil society makes no sense under the total domination of instrumental or economic rationality based upon means-ends type of relationship and expert knowledge (Dryzek, 1996: 115).

Civil society is not anti-thesis of the state but emerges in the conditions provided by the state (Hall, 1995: 16). Otherwise, 'civil society' loses its meaning and turns into an anarchical stateless situation with 'nascent' civil societies (Keane, 1998: 191). In that context of multiple public spheres and a lively civil society alongside state structures and capitalist economy, Habermas takes a position between republican/communitarian and liberal models of democracy, trying to reconcile common good and particular interests, collective identities and individuality, responsibility and liberty, without sacrificing any.

Habermas thinks that the language of state and market is basically a technical language that is related to instrumental rationality. The political community at large, on the other hand comprises the life world, which contains the potential for communicative rationality. The problem, in that framework, is to save the life world from total domination by the instrumental rationality of the bureaucratic state (power) and capitalist enterprise (money). At that junction, the Welfare State is criticized by Habermas for "colonizing the life world." In short, what Habermas proposes is not elimination of the modern state or market, but their encapsulation in a life world with multiple channels of communication. What is proposed is to strike a balance between system (the state and market) and life world, through discursive democratic practices.

What emerges from all these debates is a new planning paradigm based upon free communication among all parties in the context of future-oriented collective action. This planning paradigm depends on "story telling" as much as technical analysis (Forester, 1993). This communicative, dialogical, argumentative or democratic planning aims at consensus among

free subjects of a conversation as the standard for legitimate policy making. It is also critical to note that "dialogue here is no longer a simple ego-alter ego interaction but rather an encounter between mutually decentered agents involved in a transformative event" (Dallmayr, 2001: 346).

5. A Critical Assessment of Search for Consensus in Communicative Planning

Habermas provides planners with a broader and more fruitful concept of rationality. However, his standards in defining rationality also raise some new philosophical, political and practical problems. The most important problem in Habermas' communicative rationality is probably his strong stress on consensus as the telos of communication. Consensus formation, in that theoretical context, "rests in the end on the authority of the better argument" (Habermas, 1981: 145). However, there is no guarantee that people shall reach a consensus even when there is an ideal speech situation. "Rational disagreement," for instance, is a pervasive fact in the history of science, allegedly the most rational human activity (Brown, 1988: 192; Healy, 1996: 171).

Habermas' emphasis on consensus for collective action is particularly problematic in terms of democracy. Democracy necessitates dissent and opposition. By stressing consensus as a criterion, Habermas shows an "implicit commitment to a homogeneous public" (Young, 1990: 7). As Mouffe (1993: 141) puts it "there can never be a fully inclusive 'rational' consensus" as long as the "political" is erased, or turned into a purely technical process.

Habermas' stress on the "power of the better argument" may not always resist to the significance of power and interest in the decisions reached for action. It is not clear in Habermas how to "distinguish between a 'rational' consensus—one based upon reasoned argument—from a consensus based upon custom and power" either (Giddens, 1985: 130-131). It is not always easy to decide whether the end result emanates from the power of the better argument or 'the power of power to formulate itself as the better argument' in a real dialogue. That is a classical binary opposition between truth and power. Considering discursive and ideological aspects of power rather than just its sheer content of force, it is hard to make a clear-cut distinction between power relations and dialogical relations. At that junction, Michael Foucault and some other postmodern critics need to be taken into

account. Taking Foucault seriously, there is no communication among abstract free subjects since the subjectivity itself is a constructed entity within complex web of power relations embedded in dominant discursive practices.

Insofar as Habermas' communicative rationality, as a basis for collective action, aims at consensus and eradication of opposition, it may threaten the very existence and meaning of democracy. That is why, one need to consider and reframe Habermas' communicative rationality within the context of democratic planning. First, dialogue should not be necessarily linked or predicated upon consensus. Consensus should be one of the possibilities rather than a criterion for an ideal or successful communication for collective action. Ideal communication, in that context, should be understood literally as communication among different viewpoints and stakeholders, without any external hindrance or coercive intervention. In that communication process some differences might be eliminated while sometimes new and even bitter differences might be generated.

Second, even when there is a consensus at the end of a dialogue or communication process, this consensus needs to be considered as a provisional one that is open to be challenged at any later time or context. Consensus of whom, consensus at what time and place, consensus under what circumstances and in which sense, etc. are all legitimate questions as limits to the value of any specific consensus. Communicative planning, in that sense, does not necessarily produce and work upon consensus or unanimity, but rather stresses the preservation of open channels for future dialogue, guaranteeing the chance for different configurations of decisions for future collective action. That means, consensus is needed, at most, on the principle of continuing the dialogue and basic procedures of dialogue, rather than on the substantial issues under debate in concrete decision-making contexts.

Third, one may argue that a more flexible approach in that regard is also more practical and feasible. Processes that seek out consensus can actually endanger more conflict, consume more time and resources, provide no guarantee for final policy and compliance, encourage peer pressure, exclude dissidents for gaining consensus, generate bias in favor of status quo, and limit communicative practices with trivial issues (Conlianese, 1999)

If communicative planning is not manipulated to create an image of unanimity and consensus to hide antagonisms among different views and interests, or if it is not used to create a "manufactured certainty," the more feasible and practical function of communicative planning would be to make different alternatives visible and provide a transparent framework for making a choice in a certain context under specific political conditions. That process would also show that the solution is not a technical, neutral, impersonal and necessary result, which is beyond any political dispute, but rather as an acceptable alternative for collective action for the time being, open to political opposition and reformulation at a later date under new conditions. What is critical in this process is to make sure that the choice is being made after the debate, or that the final decision is really ex-post, not vice versa, which would reduce the whole process into a meaningless manipulation.

There would certainly be a "pre-decision" or "draft-decision" similar to Gadamer's "pre-judgment" or "prejudice," if the debate for collective action could not be conceived as starting out of a void. However, final decisions or final judgments—themselves "pre-decisions" or "pre-judgments for the future debates—need to be made ex-post and with a reasonable influence of the communicative process. Understanding should be emphasized as a standard or goal in that framework, "understanding that is open to renegotiation in time instead of consensus" (Luhmann, 1998: 69).

Last but not the least, Habermas makes a sharp and clear cut distinction between the "system" (economy and state) and the "life world," attributing them respectively instrumental and communicative rationality. In fact, this is an over-generalization and does not pay adequate attention to communicative rationality in the system and instrumental rationality in the life world. As Diaz (1995: 104) argues "neither economy nor bureaucracy is as machine-like, instrumentally rational and determinant as Habermas tend to portray." This point is particularly important for developing participatory mechanisms within formal bureaucratic structures and work places.

Up to this point Habermasian theory has been evaluated irrespective of disparities and differences among various polities. However, it should also be evaluated in terms of globalization processes and inherent inequalities among countries in that context. Habermasian theories of communicative planning have been developed mainly within the context of nation state and depend to a great extent on the legal and institutional infrastructure brought about by national practices. However, in a globalizing

world, the boundary of political community is getting blurred and thus the potential participants of a dialog are multiplied.

The position of so-called developing countries is particularly important at this junction. All the general criticisms about consensus at the "domestic" level can be repeated for the neo-liberal claims for certainty as formulated in "there is no alternative" slogan of the 1980s at the global level.

This so called "Washington Consensus," reflected in the practices of the international financial agencies, denies the political nature of planning and policy-making by reducing everything into "technical" or "optimum" solutions.

In that context, one should emphasize that the communicative planning is not just a national but also a global requirement, if it is going to be meaningful under the globalization context. That means the current approach, if not the discourse, of the international institutions needs a fundamental change towards communicative practices and real dialogue. Dialogue with developing countries and their governments should not be considered as a manipulative process to get their consent for already drawn policy proposals, but rather as a real debate on the context-bound solutions. That transformation, in turn, partly related to a "deepening" of democracy and development of communicative practices in the developed countries, which primarily shape and control such institutions. Otherwise, communicative planning in developing countries might turn into mere "talk" among powerless stakeholders.

One needs also underlie the fact that Habermas' theory is developed under the conditions of the rule of law in liberal democratic societies. What Habermas proposes also requires a particular sort of political culture open to diversity and difference. In other words, discursive democracy is a "deepening" of liberal democracy, and requires certain framework conditions made available by the former. In that context, countries having weak democratic institutions and an elitist political culture are not in a very good position to realize discursive democracy. Discrepancies between "ideal speech situation" and real speech situations, especially in the less developed parts of the world, who might not only be exposed to the repression of authoritarian "internal" rulers but also to the dictates of "external" powers (bureaucratic and financial), entails a more qualified approach.

6. Concluding Remarks on Planning and Planners

At that junction, building upon criticisms of conventional planning and Habermasian alternatives, it may be useful to have some word on the relationship of democracy, power and planning in developing countries. Conventional planning has usually been defined along technical terms. In a post-positivist global world, planning requires a broader theoretical framework and a more diversified practical application. Friedmann (1987) gives an overall picture of planning in relation with the territorial state, political system and bureaucratic practice. In this account, planning is a tool not only for system maintenance and system change, but also system transformation. In that account, it is very hard to draw a clear demarcation line between planning and politics.

Though a misperception, in its technical definition based upon instrumental rationality and expert guidance, planning could easily be considered as a non-political, and even sometimes, an anti-political endeavor. However, when it comes to communicative planning, the inherent political characteristic of any planning activity is more transparent and better acknowledged.

Planning cannot be separated from politics so far as one may always ask the question of "who plans?" and interrogate the legitimacy of planning as a process of "deciding for others" (Sartori, 1987: Chapter 12). Forester (1993: 192-197), for instance, underlies the fact that the planners are part of politics and make political and ethical choices all the time, whether they like it or not. As expressed by Heilbroner (1985: 97) "the prevailing interest system…not only designates the ends for which [one] must plan his means, but…also establishes the calculus." In that context, one should accept that planning is a highly political process, both when politics is considered as an authoritative redistribution mechanism and when it is defined as a deliberation process on the common issues of a community.

Using Parson's system view and identifying main sub-systems, Sager (1994: 38) gives a comprehensive picture on the connection between planning and politics. Planning in this context is related to politics in both its liberal and radical or discursive meanings. In the former or liberal meaning of politics, redistribution of resources produced by the economic realm is the primary subject of politics. In that context, planning, defined as rational resource utilization, is directly related to the political process defined as a redistribution mechanism. Setting priorities and making optimal choices

among alternative uses of resources are integral parts of planning practice, as much as the source of various political debates. However, with a strong emphasis on efficiency and instrumental rationality, "the politician in the [liberal] technical state is left with nothing but a fictitious decision-making power" (Habermas, 1970a: 64). Even when the political system in liberal democracies operate effectively, they do so together with a technical elite organized within the formal institutions or "think-tanks" connected with the party in power (Fischer, 1993: 34).

Politics as a discourse or as deliberation process is also related to planning as a process of forming consensus on the public policies and resource utilization. This time it is not based solely upon instrumental rationality but departs mainly from communicative rationality. However, the relationship between politics and planning or power and knowledge is still there. As has already been argued, communicative planning can solve the problem of instrumental rationality by broadening the public space and opening planning process to different stakeholders, but it cannot solve the problem of hegemonic ideology –as defined by Gramsci—and discourse as a built-in power relationship –as described by Foucault. In that context, some planning theorists focus on the role of unequal power relations and how they affect the understanding of representations of different forms of rationality. Flyvbjerg[5], for instance, shows, with reference to Foucault, that power defines reality and that rationality is context-dependent in real planning practice (Stromberg, 1999).

Globalization and representation crisis of the nation state and national politics is a significant context for discussing the relationship between planning and power. Conventional planning organizations are supposed to work on expertise and generate best or technically optimum solutions for the community. In practice, many of these institutions are losing their power on the resource utilization and policy formulation terms. The gap between what is planned and what is realized is growing under the conditions of global and local processes out of the control of the central

[5] Flyvbjerg studied the history of the prize-winning "Aalborg Project," an ambitious and comprehensive plan of the late 1970s, intended to reduce private car use and promote public transportation. This project finally turned out against the original objectives. In this case study that has influenced significantly the planning literature, he emphasizes the force of deliberate distortion of documentation, behind-the-scene negotiations, undemocratic coalitions and the dominance of rhetorical persuasion (Lapintie, 1999: 11).

planning bodies. As a related issue, and probably more importantly, the gap opens between what public at large desires and what is planned in the official documents.

The relations between governments and planning bodies are also changing in that process. Especially in the developing countries governments, under the pressures of both international institutions as well as national clientele, take decisions that do not respect in any sense to the priorities and objectives defined in plan documents[6]. As a result, plans lose their prestige and become superfluous documents.

Discussions about the relations between planning and politics in general and planning and democracy in particular leads us to power as one of the central concepts of politics. What is the effect of power on the processes and results of the planning process? Is planning, as some radical critics would argue, nothing but a technical cover for the justification and legitimacy of some powerful political and economic interests in the society?[7]

Planning is about the definition of common interest for the society and action based upon such definitions. Considering that "society" is not a unitary "subject" but rather divided along economic (class, income, occupation, etc) as well as cultural lines (social movements, minorities, religious communities, etc.), the difficulty of formulating common interest becomes obvious. Using the concept of "hegemonic ideology" developed by Gramsci, one may argue that planning in such a diversified context creates an image of unified interest, and thus, contributes to the interests of the dominant sections of society, who really shape the real content of planning.

However, very difficult though it may be, democratic politics and planning in a diversified society lose its meaning without some possibility of

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[6] For instance, in macro-economic policies the role of the IMF and the World Bank, in trade policies the WTO, etc may become more important for governments in urgent need of foreign financial resources (aids or loans); while the interests of narrow party financiers might be more effective in shaping the public investment choices that are supposed to be in line with plan priorities.

[7] Marxist critics of planning are illuminating in that regard. They argue that planning in capitalist countries mediate conflicts between capital and labor, regulate some secondary conflicts within capitalist class, and play an ideological function by hiding special interests of the capitalist class under the concept of common good, as if society is a homogeneous entity (Sager, 1994: 51; Friedmann, 1987: 437-447).

defining common interest. As Friedmann (1987: 27) argues "the state must maintain at least the appearance of serving [public interest or the common good]. If it does not, its very legitimacy may be in doubt." That is, ideological use of common interest should not eliminate possibilities of communication among different social agents. Otherwise, common interest would be limited to a perfectly homogeneous and harmonious Platonic state.

Just like the concept of rationality, the concept of common interest needs to be put in a broader context. In the last analysis it is political struggle that will determine "the outcome of tensions among different rationalities in development decision-making" (Goulet, 1986: 131). In other words, "future planning theory will have to address the Foucauldian concepts of power/knowledge and productive power more seriously" (Lapintie, 1999). Apart from an ideal search for common interest it seems to be more realistic and democratic to devise necessary mechanisms to deliberate and negotiate on the content of the common interest in concrete contexts.

"No practical planning theory comes alive without its practitioners" (Beauregard, 1998: 93). Perhaps the most important point in institutionalization and operationalization of new planning paradigm based upon communicative rationality is to redefine the planner. It is also significant to identify the role of the expert and technical knowledge vis-à-vis non-expert participants of a dialog. If rationality is not in the monopoly of the expert, then what is going to be the role of the expert in a process of argumentation aiming at reaching consensus or understanding in a non-violent way? Is expert going to be just one party among others, representing a particular viewpoint, or is he/she going to supervise the whole communication process by the use of technical superiority?

There are no easy answers to such practical questions in real settings. In all probability the old planning paradigm will not die and conventional planning activities and expertise shall play its role in public policy. In other words, communicative planning and planner will not replace but coexist with conventional planning and planner. Though both conventional and communicative planner "tell and listen 'practice stories' all the time," the dualistic nature of planning and planner should be accepted (Forester, 1993: 188; Tehrenian, 1995: 10). In this dualistic world of planning, the discursive or argumentative notion of planning depends upon the notion of planner as a participant in a political and social world (Forester, 1985: 59). With an analogy to Popper's (1979: 106) "epistemology without a knowing subject," the result will be "planning without a planning subject."

Are we going to make a distinction between different sorts of experts? Probably yes. One may distinguish between; experts that are specialists of a particular field (transport, rural development, health, etc.), experts that have a broader perspective on planning with their interdisciplinary background (policy experts), experts that are specialized in communication and facilitation techniques, and experts that combine two or more expertise cited above.

All those different kinds of experts may have a legitimate role in the communicative planning process, though their role in this process shall be different. However, as a general expectation, planning experts in communicative planning paradigm would have a special expertise in communication techniques in addition to being specialists in particular fields of planning. Planning education and curriculum should also be modified in order to serve to these new requirements (Innes, 1998).

It is also possible to classify planning experts according to their institutional and spatial connections and loyalties. In that context one may distinguish among local, community, national, international and trans-national experts; experts working for public agencies versus those working for private and civil institutions; and experts as political activists or expert-cum-political activists that provide services to political parties, civil society organizations and social movements. There is going to be planning bureaucrats in formal agencies engaged in communicative planning alongside "radical planners" as transformative community agents (Friedmann, 1987: 400).

The role of radical or community planning experts are important in that process, particularly in terms of inclusion of unorganized sections of the society into the planning process[8]. They need to act as mediators among different groups and present some ideas about the technical feasibility of the

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[8] Advocacy planning approach, developed in the United States during the 1970s, is but to reform planning by transforming the role of planner as a representative of silent majority that is not well organized to defend its interests against powerful lobbies and official bureaucracies. Feasibility of this approach may be debated as planners shall still be taking their salaries from the government and could more easily be manipulated by information from powerful interests groups (Yılmaz, 1999). However, the demand for a more responsible attitude on the part of planners is an important element, and it should be integrated into the education programs and socialization processes for planners.

ideas put forth by the participants. They are also in a position to integrate different views into a more or less consistent operational program to be implemented. That means communicative planning requires different qualifications for planning experts. At the end the approach to experts and their role in the decision making process shall also be determined in the communication process. Depending on the issue area and other particularities of the situation, each time this role definition need to be redrawn.

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