

## **Security, Globalisation, and Problems within the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in the post Cold War Era<sup>1</sup>**

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**Abstract.** It was the preoccupation of the military security concerns that dominated political thinking, strategies and even the foreign policies of the European and Mediterranean countries till the end of the Cold War. However with the termination of the Cold War and end of the bi-polar military structure, new or neglected issues of the Cold War Era could re-appear in the Mediterranean region.

The focus of this paper is to visit these new security concerns from the Euro-Mediterranean relations' perspective. Specifically, the discussion addresses the globalisation process, the motivations that pave the way for Barcelona Declaration and the problems within the Euro-Mediterranean partnership. Simply, it would be argued that within the changing nature of the security in the post Cold War Era, it is hard to separate the security of Europe from the security of the Mediterranean. In this connection for the stability and prosperity in the region both shores of the Mediterranean should co-operate on equal basis since the initiatives are not at the hands of the European anymore.

**JEL Classification Codes: Z00.**

**Key Words:** Security, Globalisation, Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.

### **1. Introduction**

It was the preoccupation of the military security concerns that dominated political thinking, strategies and even the foreign policies of the European and Mediterranean countries till the end of the Cold War. However, with the beginning of the new era in world politics so called 'post Cold War era' the boundaries of academic inquiry expand to include new and neglected issues of the Cold War.

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In this connection, an initial objective of this paper appears as to stress upon the point that with the changing dynamics of the post Cold War Era security structure of Mediterranean region constitutes organic totality. This is due to the incapability of states to solve security problems by themselves. In other words within the changing nature of the security in the post Cold War Era, it is hard to separate the security of Europe from the security of the Mediterranean. In this connection for the stability and prosperity in the region both shores of the Mediterranean should co-operate since the initiatives are not at the hands of the European's anymore in the new security agenda.

Arguably, politics, economics and foreign policy of Mediterranean countries are three concepts that linked to each other and it is almost impossible to analyze those concepts independently. Departing from this statement it would not be wrong to suggest that 'globalization process' and its socio-political implications could be embedded and analysed on this special connection. In other words main source of concerns for the Mediterranean partners derive from fear that globalisation process and its socio-economic and political implications could legalize and further satisfies European hegemony over the Mediterranean. Consequently, in addition to these concerns, uncertain conditions in the post Cold War Era and problematic nature of the globalisation shadowed the further success of Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.

## **2. The Definition and Conceptualisation of the Key Terms**

In this initial section, I will try to define and to conceptualise the key terms such as Southern Flank, Southern Partners, Security, and Globalisation in order to clarify the main subjects of this paper.

### **Southern Flank**

This paper believes that the term of 'Southern Flank' needs to be identified mainly because 'Southern Flank' countries would face the most serious challenges in the state of instability in the Eastern Mediterranean and Magreb regions. In other words, Southern Flank would be the 'frontline' of any possible threat to Europe.

The term 'Southern Flank' is used to describe 'Southern' boundaries of the European Union that have coasts in the Mediterranean Sea. Namely,

these countries are Spain, France, Italy and Greece. Sometimes Portugal is added to the list because of its geographical proximity and membership in both North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and European Union. Thus along with European Union (EU), membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Western European Union (WEU) and Organisation of Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) appear as the common points of Southern Flank countries. Also relative economic underdevelopment of these countries within the European Union (apart from France) could be named as another characteristics of the Southern Flank countries.

Generally speaking all these countries have glorious past and militarily, politically, and culturally dominated the opposite shores of the Mediterranean. Consequently, they have close historical and cultural links especially with the Maghreb and Mashreq regions. However, it is remarkable to remind that those historical and cultural links not only bring advantages but also disadvantages to the Southern Flank countries. For instance, as have stated above these countries would face with the most serious challenges in the state of instability in the Eastern Mediterranean and Magreb regions in the form of immigration waves.

### **Southern Partners**

The term of southern partners used to define Southern Mediterranean partners of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Namely, these countries are Maghreb (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia) and Mashreq (Libya, Egypt) countries. Islamic culture and tradition, colonial background, high unemployment rate, absence of civil society and democratic institutions along with dominant role of state on regulating economic activities could be listed as the common characteristics of the Southern Partners. In these countries expectations from the state are so high mainly because the function of the state has expanded almost every sector of the society. Consequently, the state is the largest employer and the largest investor.

The importance of Southern Partners for European Security is formidable. Any socio-economic and political instability in Southern Partners and especially in Maghreb could destabilize Southern Flank in many ways. If rising expectations of people in poorer parts of the Mediterranean are not assuaged then there is a danger of civil unrest and the outbreak of violent protest like in the case of Algeria. Eventually, any

political violence or war in North Africa or in Eastern Mediterranean would cause social and economic pressures and tensions especially to the Southern Flank states. For instance as a historical reference terrorist attacks linked to the Middle Eastern conflict were carried out on Italian territory in the 1980s that forced Italy to join all multinational operations in the Mediterranean region after 1981.<sup>3</sup> In particular, Italy and France are the most vulnerable Southern Flank countries and could be directly affected by instability that could derive both from the Southern Partners.

### **Security**

As has emphasised earlier, with the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and disintegration of the Soviet Union, the traditional bi-polar military structure in Europe was brought to an end. Although the end of the Cold War did not completely terminate the military security concerns of the Euro-Mediterranean Countries, it is quite clear that there had been a shift. Rees put forward this as: “The Cold War period was so dominated by the issue of military security that other important issues were relatively neglected”.<sup>4</sup> Therefore, as Rees highlights, the ‘shadowed’ issues under the dominance of the Cold War could (re) appear especially in the Mediterranean region in the post Cold War era.

Putting it differently, understanding the new order in the Mediterranean and the Europe requires a complex analysis. This is to suggest that new (dis)order in the Mediterranean has become more uncertain and more complex than the Cold War period because in the new security agenda there is more than ‘one’ source of threat for the Europe and Mediterranean countries that is different in nature, multi-face & multi-dimensional. As stated by McInnes: “Security is now seen to encompass a whole range of issues including individual human right, the economic security of individuals and societies, and the planetary issues of environmental security.”<sup>5</sup> Being consistent with this view, this paper’s belief is that socio-economic concerns such as unemployment, high population growth rates, immigration, environmental degradation, cultural aspects and poor economic performance in the Southern Partners constitute the principal security threats to Europe in a ‘globalised’ world politics.

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<sup>3</sup> R. Aliboni (1992: 77).

<sup>4</sup> G. W. Rees (1993:8).

<sup>5</sup> C. McInnes (1993:71).

Lastly, it is worth to mention that in new security agenda the capability of states and governments to provide satisfactory solutions to the major security issues is restricted mainly because new issues are not wholly within their jurisdiction. Therefore solution of the security problems requires collaborative actions and any attempt to solve these problems independently is bound to fail. Stating differently, stability in the Mediterranean is no longer in the initiative of the European Union states since European Union states are no more sole determinant of the Europe's security.

### **Globalisation**

Broadly speaking, globalisation process could be explained by three ways:

1. Globalisation as a process that integrated world economy. In other words globalisation as an economic phenomenon and as an expansion of world economy that cannot be controlled by states.
2. Globalisation as historical epoch that fastened after the Post Cold War. In other words, globalization as an evolutionary political process associated with spread of democracy and human rights.
3. Globalisation as technological and social revolution that communication among nations and cultures becomes easier, faster, and deeper.

According to liberal scholar Fukuyama, globalisation is the 'end of the history' that Western forms of 'liberal' governments, political economy and political community is the ultimate destination, which the entire human race desires to reach. This statement includes at least three assumptions:

1. Political and economic development always terminates at liberal-capitalist democracy. In other words, non-Western world is determined to follow Western route of modernization.
2. West is loyal to the moral truths that are in 'progress' which could be possible regardless of national and cultural distinction.
3. 'Progress' in human history could be measured by the elimination of global conflict and international adaptation of 'legitimacy'. This principle is further maintained by Doyle's principle of 'democratic states not go to war with each other'.

Apart from political implications, Globalisation process also have some negative economic implications. For instance, as stressed by Keohane and Nye globalisation is accompanied by increasing gaps in many respects between the rich and the poor. Therefore, it implies neither homogenisation nor equity.<sup>6</sup> Thus it is important to remember that unequal and uneven development at the world scale remains as a function of globalism. Globalisation is embedded in and integral to the global modernity which operational procedure is universalization and totality. In other words, through globalisation particular will add into the universal, difference into sameness in which there would be re-production of an organic constituting totality.

To epitomize, there is a risk that ‘globalisation’ could turn to the superiority of Western institutions, conceptions and rationality through historically unified single and hegemonic cultural system. In other words in the name of ‘totality’ and ‘universality’ the groups that defined ‘Other’ could be destructed, excluded, denied and marginalized by defining as irrational, underdeveloped or belong to the past. In the Mediterranean area this ‘Other’ could be Southern Partners and Islamic culture.

### **3. The Requirement for New Institutional Forms in the Euro-Mediterranean Relations & Barcelona Declaration**

In the earlier sections it has been underlined that in new security agenda the capability of states and governments to provide satisfactory solutions to the major security issues is restricted mainly because new issues are not wholly within their jurisdiction. This means that European Union cannot ignore the socio-economic problems of its Southern Partners since they may perceive threat not only from the power and intention of Southern Partners but also from their internal dynamics and factors. Thus it is clear that stability in the Mediterranean is no longer in the initiative of the European Union states and European Union states are no more sole determinant of the Europe’s security. This situation is perfectly defined by Immanuel Kant as “security complex includes group of states where primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically

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<sup>6</sup> R. O. Keohane and J. S. Nye Jr. (2000:106).

be considered apart from one another".<sup>7</sup>

Then what could be the major security threats to Europe in the era of globalisation? As have stressed earlier in the new security agenda the 'nature' of threats are more related with socio-economic issues than the military ones. The consequences of political, social and economic problems have induced a growing dissatisfaction especially among the Southern Mediterranean Partners alienated young population. This situation generally resulted with immigration towards Europe that should be the most serious security threat to Europe because of the limited capacities of the European countries to regulate strict immigration control. As mentioned by Ole Waever with changing security concepts, societal security achieved greater importance that refers to the situations in which significant groups within a society feel their identity threatened by immigration, integration and cultural imperialism. Carr added that by increasing cultural differences within society, it threatens the very existence of 'belonging' that lies at the core of national identity, which in turn generates problems of security and societal order.<sup>8</sup>

Therefore, immigration could react as the cultural conformity of the Europe and turn to the racist movement in Southern Flank countries. In different words, although the spread and uprising of nationalism is hindered by the balanced policies within the European Union, the risk could not be discredited totally. Immigration created an atmosphere especially for the nationalist right wing parties, newspapers, magazines and TV channels in the Southern Flank countries to fear about the growing of the alien culture and minority ethnic groups. Consequently, increasing population in the Mediterranean restricted and declined the rate of population in Europe who felt Europeans. In sum, there is a risk that fascism could be reborn in Mediterranean if immigration cannot be controlled.

In addition to the political causes, there are also economic reasons that fuelled the threats of immigration. The unemployment rate within the European Union is around ten percent. However, in Spain the estimated figure is around twenty two percent<sup>9</sup>. Among other Southern Flank countries Greece has ten, France has twelve point five and Italy has twelve percent of unemployment rate. These figures are getting worse every passing day due to the illegal immigration and arrival of the cheap workers from

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<sup>7</sup> I. Kant. (1970:206).

<sup>8</sup> F. Carr. (1998:12).

<sup>9</sup> See Eurostat (1998).

Mediterranean partners. However, figures and statistics proved that Europe would need cheap unskilled workers in the future. This would mean that the unemployment rate among the Southern Flank countries would rise since “Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco will double their population within the next thirty years, while three million Maghrebis are already work in Europe”.<sup>10</sup>

To sum up, it would not be wrong to argue that geographical proximity and security threats derived from that geographical proximity makes Euro-Mediterranean partnership obligatory for Europe. Consequently, all these facts inevitably ordered an approach that favours dialogue and institutionalisation among regional Mediterranean countries that are under the effect of same security systems within the same geographical space. Barcelona Declaration that signed in November 1995 was a carefully tailored attempt to solidify Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Barcelona Declaration was comparatively important and new development regarding to the earlier attempts of Euro-Mediterranean partnership since it includes greater number of participants (Twenty-Seven participants; Fifteen European Union, and Twelve Regional members) and covers extended co-operation including economic, security and cultural areas.

Main objectives of the Barcelona declaration were:

1. To form political and security partnership,
2. Creating an area of shared prosperity through the establishment of a free trade area by the year 2010,
3. Partnership in social, cultural and human affairs and
4. Economic co-operation and financial assistance from Europe to the other Mediterranean countries.

#### **4. Problems within the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP)**

As stated above, Barcelona Declaration was an important attempt for Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Nevertheless it contains certain contradictory points that need to be emphasized.

First of all as stated by George Joffe, the Euro-Mediterranean partnership reflects and maintained the hegemony that Europe has

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<sup>10</sup> R. Aliboni, (1992:25).

established over the Mediterranean region.<sup>11</sup> In all periods of the history there was a political, economic and cultural interactions in the region mostly in the form of colonial relationships. Eventually European Union countries always hold the economic privilege and advantage on their relationship with the Mediterranean partners. Nevertheless, Euro-centric approach has no historical reference to the imperial past and exploitation of the former colonies. Moreover, historical enmities has been forgotten and it has been ignored that it was imperialist powers that created those artificial boundaries in the Eastern and Southern Mediterranean.

Thus, historical background has been neglected in Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Casually, there is a wide spread belief in the Southern Partners that developed European countries achieved their economic successes by explicitly exploiting the markets of the Southern Partners and in that sense Southern Partners have been the historical victims of European colonialism. Eventually, one may not surprise from Southern Partners perception that Euro-Mediterranean Partnership that initiated in Barcelona develops mechanisms, rules and norms to further “satisfice” and “legitimise” European partners privileged status.

Secondly, Southern Mediterranean countries have participated to the Euro Mediterranean Partnership due to lack of alternative and Barcelona declaration offers little guarantee of a solution to their social, political and economic problems. This led Southern partners to remain highly sceptical on Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. This is again due to the misperception of Europe on regional problems. European Countries make little effort to understand the region and its problems and instead applied Euro-centric perspective and diagnosis as a solution. Consequently the driving force for EMP appeared as the security and welfare of Europe.

Thirdly, in relation with the globalisation process, there are a growing number of states that reject the superiority of Western modernity and its universality. This trend also valid in the Mediterranean region. From the perspective of Southern Partners West’s political and human rights agenda sometimes perceived as form of cultural imperialism. In other words, from the Southern Partners perspective it is believed that Western institutions, conceptions and rationality will ‘globalize’ and complete the region in hegemonic relationship. Furthermore, since European Union

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<sup>11</sup> R. Gillespie, (ed). (1997:12).

countries hold the economic supremacy and two boxers are not at the same weight, this would bring the concern that European Union's economic dependency could form cultural hegemony and interfere to domestic politics in Southern Partners. Lastly, it is important to remember that 'democratic and universalised' principles of the West could create political turbulence that order in the opposite shores of the Mediterranean.

Fourthly, it has been clearly stressed that privileges of the European Union are to be economically prosper and politically stable. But what will happen when these two principles contradicts with each other? While European Union attempt to integrate region through economic co-operation and show its intention for economic assistance, it has adopted a protectionist attitude towards Mediterranean partners especially on agricultural trade. In other words, in the cases like agricultural production where products 'not complete but compete' with each other, European Union continue to protect its citizens that contradicts with the 'soul' of the EMP. Then, the crucial problem at the issue of the sake appeared as what will be the final criteria for European Union in the era of globalisation? Ethics or economics? In other words, accordingly the questions that should be asked at the sake of the analysis are: 'To what extend Europe will give up from its privileged position in economic terms?'. 'To what extend European Union would like to share its prosperity with others?'. And thus 'will European Union act in contrast to the economic mechanism of globalisation that is to produce or buy a community with the most reasonable prices?'.

Fifthly, one other paradox in EMP is the uncertain connection between the free market system and economic liberalization measures in the Southern Partners. It is suggested that introducing free market systems would be a catalyst for legislative reforms and work in favour of less corruption, more transparency and easing internal social tensions in the South and East Mediterranean. However, in the case of economic liberalization all corporations were expected to concentrate on their production objectives in expense of the dismissal of considerable number of workers. This could create potential social crises, political instability and more immigration to Europe. At this point El-Kenz argued that under current conditions, privatisation and liberalization policies could not be succeeded (in Southern Partners) where client patron relationship supplemented by "values that based on speculation, easy profit the hustler mentality and corruption".<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> A. El Kenz (1991:35).

Lastly, the problems of democracy and human rights constitute one other paradox of EMP. While European Union pushing for economic liberalization, same sensitivity did not give to the democratisation measures. Treaty on European Union forms is proposed that EU shall work “to develop and consolidate democracy and rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.” Furthermore it has been acknowledged that European Union considered freedom of expression and political participation as the main necessities for further collaboration in EMP. However, paradoxically, in the EMP it is also recognized that each signatory has a right to choose and freely develop their own political, socio-cultural, economic and judicial system. Thus, there is a moderate hope that EMP could be catalyst towards democratisation and improvement on human rights. Accordingly, only if European Union assistance to Mediterranean partners address to the development of civil societies, respect for human rights and political liberalization rather than blind help to the authoritarian governments there could be progress towards democratisation.

## **5. Concluding Comments**

This short analysis had begun with its assertion that the security of the Mediterranean is the security of Europe and maintaining stability in the Mediterranean are no longer in the initiative of the European Union. As European Union is not security-based organisation, Euro-Mediterranean partnership as an internal circle, seeking more prominence than ever. In recognising the complexity involved in understanding the security complexes in the post-Cold War era, this paper attempted to provide the limited framework in order elucidate the security of the Mediterranean. My overall purpose was to analyse post-Cold War security structure in the Mediterranean region giving specific emphasis to the new security threats and structures among the very broad topics and issues. Since the parameters of this paper were restricted, I decided to focus relatively more important issues in the new security agenda such as immigration, unemployment and cultural issues.

In the post Cold War Era it was obvious that geographical proximity makes Euro-Mediterranean partnership obligatory for Europe with an approach that favours dialogue and institutionalisation. Although Euro-Mediterranean Partnership that initiated in Barcelona has promising principles, it was full of

paradoxes. Among the many paradoxes, the most prominent one is the ambiguity of whether European Union will safeguard the common values, fundamental interests of the Union or respect to the non-partners rights in expense of their economic loss under the cruel conditions of globalisation?

There is no need to stress that Southern partners of the Mediterranean shall assist economically. Nevertheless, accordingly, these economic aids should be carefully monitored that they should not work as assistance to a specific regime. Instead only by improving the climate for investment, increasing the competitiveness of local industries, aids & programs that would assist directly to ordinary people could be part of the solution. Nevertheless without improvement in civil society, human rights and democratisation, the economic successes will not be meaningful and sustainable in the long term.

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