

Theorising the Politics of Globalisation: A Critique of Held *et al.*'s "Transformationalism"

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Abstract. This article tries to review the attempts to theorize both the politics and criticisms of the unpredictable and turbulent process of globalisation by considering one of the main critiques of the globalisation process, namely, the work of David Held and his colleagues which has surveyed the controversial approaches to globalisation and divided its participants into three schools of thought: sceptics, hyperglobalizers and transformationalists.

JEL Classification Codes: Z00.

Key Words: Held, D., A. McGrew, D. Goldblatt, and J. Perraton. (1999). *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture*.

1. Introduction

According to Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, and Perraton, "globalisation is an idea whose time has come...yet, it [globalisation] lacks precise definition" (1999, p.1).¹ Despite the imprecision of the term "globalisation," the use of the term, according to Held and McGrew, reflects increased inter-connectedness in political, economic and cultural matters across the world creating a "shared social space" (*ibid.*) Given this inter-connectedness, globalisation may be defined as "a process (or set of processes) which embodies a transformation in the spatial organisation of social relations and transactions, expressed in transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction and power" (*ibid.*, p. 16). While there are many definitions of globalisation, such a definition seeks to bring together the many and seemingly contradictory theories of globalisation into a

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¹ Subsequently throughout the paper, all references to *Global Transformations* will only include the first two authors for expositional simplicity.

“rigorous analytical framework” and “proffer a coherent historical narrative” (*ibid.*, p.1).²

Held and McGrew’s analytical framework is constructed by developing a three part typology of theories of globalisation consisting of “hyper-globalist,” “sceptic,” and “transformationalist” categories.³ Hyper-globalists purportedly argue that “contemporary globalisation defines a new era in which peoples everywhere are increasingly subject to the disciplines of the global marketplace” (*ibid.*, p. 2). Given the importance of the global marketplace, multi-national enterprises (MNEs) and inter- governmental organisations (IGOs) which regulate their activity are key political actors. Sceptics, such as Hirst and Thompson (1996) ostensibly argue that “globalisation is a myth which conceals the reality of an international economy increasingly segmented into three major regional blocs in which national governments remain very powerful” (Held and McGrew, 1999, p. 2). Finally, transformationalists such as Rosenau (1997) or Giddens (1990) argue that globalization occurs as “states and societies across the globe are experiencing a process of profound change as they try to adapt to a more interconnected but highly uncertain world” (Held and McGrew, 1999, p. 2).

Developing the transformationalist category of globalisation theories, Held and McGrew present a rather complicated typology of globalisation based on globalisation’s spread, depth, speed, and impact, as well as its impacts on infrastructure, institutions, hierarchical structures and the unevenness of development (1999, p. 14-27).⁴ They imply that the “politics of globalisation” have been “transformed” (using their word from the definition of globalisation) along all of these dimensions because of the emergence of a new system of “political globalisation.” They define “political globalisation” as the “shifting reach of political power, authority

² A definition qualitatively different from the one covered by Held and McGrew is Castells (2000) which analyses globalisation based on the effects of technology, manufacturing processes and social networks.

³ Throughout the text, quotation marks will not be placed around the categories of hyper-globalist, sceptic and transformationalist to avoid distracting the reader from text quotations. However, quotation mark omission does not constitute an uncritical acceptance of these concepts.

⁴ Held and McGrew (1999) do not label their theory as “transformationalist.” However, Held and McGrew (2001) do cite their 1999 work under the rubric “An Intermediate Way: the Transformationalist Analysis” thus explicitly labelling their theory as a transformationalist theory and explicitly seeking to place it analytically “in-between” hyper-globalist and sceptic theories.

and forms of rule" based on new organisational interests which are "trans-national" and "multi-layered." These organisational interests combine actors identified under the hyper-globalist category (namely IGOs and MNEs) with those of the sceptics (trading blocs and powerful states) into a new system where each of these actors exercises their political power, authority and forms of rule. Thus, the "politics of globalisation" is equivalent to "political globalisation" for Held and McGrew. It is that definition that this paper questions). Logically deconstructing their argument, if *a* is defined as "globalisation" (as defined above), *b* as the organisational interests such as MNEs, IGOs, trading blocs, and powerful states, and *c* as "political globalisation" (also as defined above), then their argument reduces to $a \rightarrow b \rightarrow c$.

In this essay, I shall critique each link of Held and McGrew's chain of argumentation. First, I will argue that Held and McGrew's characterisation of hyperglobalist and sceptic theories – defining what globalisation is not -- distorts the opinions of those theorists. Each of the analytical categories comprising their transformationalist theory – defining what globalisation is -- lacks specific definition or empirical substantiation. Held and McGrew appear simply to substitute a single ambiguous term "globalisation" with a series of equally ambiguous sub-categories lacking empirical or theoretical support. This is tantamount to arguing that they fail to define *a*. Second, their typology provides them with a vehicle for (unsuccessfully) incorporating IGOs, MNEs, regional blocs and powerful states into one paradigm. However, they fail to demonstrate the effects that these actors have on political globalisation and they omit many other actors including national governments, local governments, individuals, and national business interests. Thus, they fail to establish a causal link between *a* and *b* and they mis-specify *b* by failing to include key actors such as national governments. As such, $a \rightarrow b$ is false. Thirdly, I will critique their concept of "political globalisation" by arguing that they fail to show how the actors they identify (the elements of *b*) create a trans-national and multi-layered system of politics. They also fail to define "political globalisation" (as represented by *c* under the logical deconstruction proposed above). Thus $b \rightarrow c$ is also false under their formulation of "globalisation."⁵

⁵ Disproving Held and McGrew's (1999) formulation of globalisation is important because as James Roseneau states on the book's front cover, it is the "definitive work on globalization." The book's definitiveness, however, stems from the fact that many interpreters adopt a similar method of argumentation as Held and McGrew.

2. A Critique of the Conceptual Category of “Hyperglobalist”

According to Held and McGrew (1999, p. 3-5), hyperglobalist authors argue that globalisation is characterised by the purported existence of a unified global economy spanning across the world’s political boundaries. National economic regulation then becomes less effective because decisions which affect the spatial organisation of economic power and wealth are determined by the capital budgeting and portfolio investment decisions of foreign economic organisations such as multi-national enterprises (MNE). Supporting this arrangement are organisations such as the Group of 7, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the World Trade Organisation and other inter-governmental organisations (IGOs) which promote the elaboration of international regulations serving to facilitate the growth of this “global civilisation” through trade, investment, exchange rate, regulatory, and factor market liberalisation (*ibid.*, p. 4). Since the authority of states is bounded – both territorially and politically by commitments to these international organisations -- global markets can supposedly escape effective national regulation. In this “borderless world” -- the title of Kenichi Ohmae’s (1990) book -- it inevitably seems to follow that states have no option other than to accommodate global market forces through reducing welfare benefits (in order to attract investments through international fiscal competition) and weakening social democracy (due to the setting of government priorities abroad rather than by domestic voting constituencies). The major implication for the politics of globalisation is that IGOs, MNEs and other external actors would seem to play the key role in any state’s political decisions.⁶

For example, Fukuda Parr (2002) notes that the new era of globalisation causes inequalities between those who benefit and are harmed by globalisation. These groups in turn represent changing political interests which shape the development agenda. As such, she merely changes the *b* in Held and McGrew’s argument to winners and losers of globalisation. However, much like Held and McGrew, she unquestioningly assumes that new impacts in technology herald a new era of globalisation (without explaining how). Kaplinsky (2002) uses the same logical argument and divides globalisation scenarios into positive, uncertain, and negative outcomes (which roughly correspond to Held and McGrew’s hyper-globalist, transformationalist, and sceptic labels respectively).

⁶ Held and McGrew make reference to Gill (1995), Ohmae (1995), and Strange (1996) for this assertion.

However, the category of hyperglobalist falsely essentialises a variety of positions which are analytically distinct. First, it de-emphasizes competitive reactions by governments. Governments hold votes in international organisations and states still retain the monopoly of legitimate violence as a method of enforcing regulation. Ohmae, a supposed hyperglobalist, notes several ways which governments react to globalisation – Japan's industrial policy and general exchange rate policy are examples (1990, pp. 10-15 and pp. 177-179). Another example which shows the power of states -- and provides an argument inconsistent with Held and McGrew's classification scheme -- comes from international financier George Soros' (2002) book *On Globalization*. He holds that globalisation is a powerful and unstoppable force (a hyperglobalist position). However, he also notes that the globalisation of international financial markets can be a destabilising force for the world economy (a sceptic view). Thus, states must change the international financial architecture to take into account the need to better manage these dangers on the international level (a transformationalist position). The categories of hyper-globalist, sceptic and transformationalist are evidently not mutually exclusive, but overlap. More importantly, the state still remains an actor in development politics.

Second, Held and McGrew appear to distort the arguments of the hyperglobalists in a number of ways. Ohmae (1990) does not claim that global markets comprise a "global market civilisation" as Held and McGrew attribute to him (1999, p. 4). Instead, he stresses the important role of the "interlinked economy" of the Triad (US, European Union and Japan) in the determination of the global economy – making him in fact a sceptic (in the sense which Held and McGrew define) rather than a hyper-globalist (1999, p. 186-187) . Moreover, Ohmae does indeed recognise the importance of national economic regulation for the multi-national enterprise. However, he stresses that globalisation will promote the replacement of inefficient and rent-seeking regulation with what he considers socially and economically beneficial regulation (*ibid.*, p. 10-12). Furthermore, Ohmae acknowledges that international businesses are still constrained by home country regulation. Thus, even supposed hyperglobalists such as Ohmae recognise that national regulation is needed for international business.

Third, Held and McGrew discuss the decreasing capacity of the state to regulate or conduct policy – especially welfare policy (1999, p. 4). This is simply incorrect. For example, between 1980 and 1992, there was an increase from 8.6% to 10.2% in the average percentage of GDP spent on

[public] health and welfare services in the OECD countries (Australia Institute of Health and Welfare, 1997).⁷ Moreover, in cases where welfare was reduced, concerns about large fiscal deficits played a role as important if not more important than concerns about attracting international funds. Indeed, there are even arguments to suggest that globalisation will *increase* the need for governments to provide welfare services due to economic and social dislocations attendant with changing compositions of factor, import, and export markets (Woods, 1996).⁸ Given these critiques, it appears less likely that IGOs and MNEs constitute new global political interests in the way that Held and McGrew ascribe them to be under their hyper-globalist label. The national state still has an important role to play.

3. A Critique of the Conceptual Category of “Sceptics”

Held and McGrew’s (1999) second analytical category, as summarised from pages 5-7, for globalisation theories comprises the sceptics. Unlike the theoretical uniformity which supposedly characterises hyperglobalists, sceptics may be characterised by one or more of several traits. First, sceptics are described as disputing the novelty of globalisation -- citing evidence that globalisation has been occurring for centuries. Authors such as Hirst and Thompson (1999) in their sceptical sounding title *Globalisation in Question* note that trade and investment flows were higher between 1890-1914 than at present.⁹ Second, they claim that globalisation has been largely confined to the major OECD member countries responsible for developing the international regulations which govern the expansion of globalisation – sometimes through IGOs but sometimes also unilaterally (*ibid.*). Third, they contend that a number of regional trading blocs are emerging in the Americas (NAFTA and MERCOSUR), in Europe (EU) and in Asia (ASEAN).¹⁰ So it is regionalisation rather than globalisation which characterises the economic, political and social features determining the

⁷ Such a figure represents the average and may not reflect the trends of specific individual OECD member countries such as the United Kingdom.

⁸ Given the current ineffectiveness of national tax authorities to collect taxes from MNEs, such welfare policies provide MNEs with a stable workforce without them having to pay for social benefits.

⁹ Many other authors such as O’Rourke and Williamson (1999) have noted similar trends -- where economic integration is measured by the relative proportions of exports, imports, or capital account items to total real GDP.

¹⁰ Held and McGrew cite Ruigrok and Tulder (1995) among others as proponents of this argument.

politics of globalisation. Sceptics stress the political role of major actors such as OECD governments, countries with large influence in their trading region, and competition between trading blocs.

Just as in the case of the "hyperglobalists" semantic bin, Held and McGrew essentialise sceptic authors in a number of ways. First, Hirst and Thompson do not deny the important of globalisation, as Held and McGrew claim (1999, pp.5-6). Instead, they seek to occupy the same "intermediate way" which Held and McGrew (2001) try to occupy by claiming that the effects of globalisation lie in between those views which see it as unimportant and those which claim that globalisation will change the world. They try to claim this "intermediate way" by differentiating between the global economy and the international economy.

There is a vast difference between a strictly global economy and a highly internationalized economy in which most companies trade from their bases in distinct national economies. In the former national policies are futile, since economic outcomes are determined wholly by world market forces and by the internal decisions of transnational companies. In the latter national policies remain viable, indeed they are essential in order to preserve the distinct styles and strengths of the national economic base and the companies that trade from it (Hirst and Thompson, 1996, p. 185).

Second, the same forces which are said to drive globalisation for the hyper-globalists are the same ones which drive "regionalisation" for the sceptics. However, Held and McGrew offer no argument why such forces would "stop" at the limits of a natural region. Instead, Held and McGrew seem to take certain "regions" such as the European Union or ASEAN as natural units of analysis – without questioning whether these constitute "natural" regions or questioning the optimality of these regions' sizes for political or economic management. Indeed, Held and McGrew claim that sceptics would argue that globalisation is confined to the rich North countries (1999, p. 6). Yet, such a claim could not be classified as a globalisation theory given that a theory of globalisation should cover the globe. As such, classifying regionalisation theorists together with sceptic theories allows Held and McGrew to reject such explanations in favour of their own "transformationalist" theory.

Lastly, this characterisation of sceptics ignores an important class of theories which account for interests behind the politics of globalisation associated with the national state, sub-national administrations, and local sectors acting on the state -- such as business interests. Regarding the role of the state, Dollar and Collier (2001) suggest that responsible macroeconomic and fiscal policy determine whether states benefit or are harmed by globalisation. Another state-centred explanation for the differential impacts of globalisation is de Soto's (2000), who theorises that states which enforce property rights are better able to benefit from globalisation through increased investment attractiveness. Both these theories suggest that the state is still an important political actor in global politics. Regarding sub-national regions, according to the World Bank (2000), the rise of global cities represents a key aspect of globalisation – a phenomenon they call “localisation.” In 1950, 40% of the world's largest cities were located in developing countries. By 2015, this figure will approach 80%. As noted by the Bank, “both globalisation and localisation often require responses that are beyond the control of a single national government” (World Bank, 2000). With localisation, cities and localities become global players. A third type of political interest is discussed by Leys (2001) who notes that globalisation has promoted the elaboration of government policy aimed at ensuring a stable macro-economic environment and facilitating the action of the private sector to provide public services. Leys argues that public services are becoming increasing “commoditised,” civil servants increasingly driven by considerations of cost-recovery, and the state has become the implicit underwriter for private sector risk. Given these three points, national governments, sub-national governments, and national business are actors whose interests affect political globalisation in ways which may be more or less important than the influences of powerful states or regional trading blocs.

4. A Critique of the “Transformationalist” position

Held and McGrew ask the question, “is a productive synthesis between these two positions [hyperglobalist and sceptic] possible?” (2001). Held and McGrew offer their own “intermediate way” transformationalist position, which argues that the globalisation (as the “transformation in the spatial organisation of social relations and transactions”) involves the “re-engineering’ the power, functions and authority of national governments” (1999, p. 8). Such a reorganisation for them comprises an extension of existing power relations around the world. However, such power relations do

not fully integrate (as in the purported hyperglobalist position) or totally divide (as in the sceptic position). Instead, globalisation is "highly uneven in its embrace and impact, it divides as it integrates" (Held and McGrew, 2001). In order to develop their theory, they devise a complicated model of globalisation where globalisation is *defined* as the sum of socio-temporal dimensions and organisational profiles. Spatio-temporal globalisation includes "extensivity," "intensivity," "velocity," and "impact" of social relations and transactions. Organisational profiles refer to "infrastructures," "institutionalisation," "stratification" and "models of interaction" (unevenness) which affect these social relations and transactions. Due to space considerations, I will only consider the spatio-temporal dimensions (Held and McGrew, p. 17).

Extensivity refers to the "stretching" of social, political and economic activities across geographical space. Intensivity is defined as the growing "magnitude" of interconnectedness in areas such as the flows of trade, investment, finance, migration, or culture. Velocity refers to the acceleration of global "interactions and processes" due to world-wide systems of transport and communication, which speed up the diffusion of ideas, goods, information, capital, and people. Finally, impact refers to deepening "significance" that distant events can have elsewhere in the world.

In many ways, this theory of globalisation simply replaces Held and McGrew's ambiguous labels with other ambiguous labels. For example, how would one measure "extensivity" and the degree of "stretch" of social relations? Held and McGrew do not measure it -- except to offer a grid which discusses such extensivity (1999, p. 79). In their grid for political globalisation, they claim that the "early modern" period from 14th – 18th century is characterised by "largely intra-territorial and intra-regional" relations with the "beginnings of imperial expansion." Their "modern" period covering the 19th and 20th century is characterised by "global empires and a global system of nation-states." Finally, the "contemporary" period from 1945 onward covers a "global states system, global political order, and regionalisation of politics and inter-regionalism." In each of these cases, however, these assertions are not supported by empirical evidence and categories such as "global states system" are taken for granted. In this way, Held and McGrew have taken the static essentialised concept of "globalisation"; they have broken it down into other static and essentialised labels such as "extensivity" and defined these labels with other static and essentialised labels such as "global political order."

Having failed to define globalisation reasonably, Held and McGrew also fail to demonstrate how such globalisation impacts upon potential political interests tied to the politics of globalisation. Even if Held and McGrew were able to differentiate qualitatively between their labels of “diffused globalisation” (characterised by high extensivity, high intensity, high velocity, and low impact) from “thin globalisation” (characterised by high extensivity, low intensity, low velocity, and low impact), it is not clear what difference this would make to a political analysis (1999, p. 25). For example, one could try to assess the degree of globalisation as measured by the involvement of the WTO in a country’s trading policies. Yet, it is difficult to see how this involvement could be described as more “extensive” vis-a-vis national government. Moreover, supposing that one country had more intensive involvement by the WTO in their trading arrangements, while another country had more WTO missions (thus having higher “velocity”), it is difficult to see how these elements could be added together to derive some useful measure of globalisation which could be correlated with a measure of change in the overall politics of globalisation.

5. Deconstructing Held and McGrew’s Argument

In some ways, Held and McGrew’s discussion of globalisation is trivial -- in the sense that their book presents a definition of globalisation and then simply restates various elements of the definition. Repeating their definition, “globalization can be conceived as a process (or set of processes) which *embodies a transformation* in the spatial organization of social relations ...” (Held and McGrew, 1999; *italics mine*). The transformational aspect of globalisation is implicit in Held and McGrew’s definition. Given that such a definition covers transformation broadly defined, it allows every change to be an impact of globalisation.¹¹

Thus, by their own definition, all the theorists they critique would be considered as “transformationalists.” Ohmae, as noted earlier, claimed that globalisation did affect national policy, but that governments maintained a wide range of options. Indeed, even more seemingly hyper-globalist authors such as Thomas Friedman (2000), whose book’s subtitle suggests that his

¹¹ Logically, their definition of globalisation is tautological – they redefine *a* (globalisation) as *t* (transformation) and then proceed to define *t* in terms of eight components.

book is the key to *Understanding Globalization* and who claims that "globalisation is the system which replaced the Cold War system," also describes a "transformation" where states still retain an important role in political globalisation. However, globalisation also causes, for Friedman, the emergence of a class of interests affecting such political globalisation -- such as "super-markets" and "super-empowered individuals." As previously discussed, sceptics such as Hirst and Thompson also may be seen as trying to position themselves in the analytical "intermediate way" defined by Held and McGrew under their transformationalist theories. Staking an analytic middle ground appears to be a strategy of globalisation writers to increase the credibility of their arguments given a paucity of evidence and semantic imprecision.¹² As such, these authors fail to define globalisation (the first element *a* in their argument).

Held and McGrew also fail to show how globalisation affects organisational interests. Instead, they assume that the locational span of MNEs and IGOs equates to direct political influence. For MNEs, they note that "in 1998, there were 53,000 MNCs worldwide with 450,000 foreign subsidiaries which had global sales of \$9.5 trillion" (1999, p. 236). Of these, South, East, and Southeast Asia had almost 100,000 foreign affiliate companies while Eastern Europe had about 53,000. For IGOs, Held and McGrew note that in 1909, there were 37 intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), while in 1996, there were nearly 2,600 IGOs -- up from 37 in 1909 (1999, p. 53). Looking at the specific case of Sweden, in 1950, it belonged to 35 IGOs while by 1991, had increased that participation to 87. Bilateral diplomatic connectedness has also increased. In 1950, the United States was connected to 70 countries through diplomatic representation. By 1991, this number had increased to 150 countries. Yet, giving evidence about the size or number of these organisations in no way demonstrates their financial or political impact on the host country. Indeed, for many of these IGOs in many countries, their relative influence or power within the host countries is relatively small. Therefore, they have failed to show how globalisation affects organisational interests (thus failing to prove $a \rightarrow b$).

¹² Logically, *a* is the set of globalisation theories which can be partitioned into *a'* (hyperglobalist), *a''* (sceptic), and *a'''* (transformationalist) where *a'''* is defined as true subject to *a'* and *a''* being false. The assumption which the authors make is that if NOT *a'* and NOT *a''*, then *a'''* is true. In other words, they set up straw man arguments of hyper-globalist and sceptic and ask the reader to accept the transformationalist thesis because the other arguments are assumed to be false.

Finally, Held and McGrew seem to have failed to demonstrate that this transformation -- which defines globalisation -- results in “political globalisation.” They cite AIDS and migration as “new” problems which spill over the boundaries of nation-states (1999, p. 445-446). Yet, they ignore the fact that other “international” problems -- such as the Black Death -- posed even greater risks to populations (as a percentage of population affected) killing between 25% to 50% of European populations (Clark and Dittrich, 1997).¹³ Political responses to such problems do not constitute the creation of a new “fragile system of multilayered global and regional governance” increasingly governed by a framework of “cosmopolitan law” -- or law which circumscribes the political power of states (*ibid.*, pp. 70-77).¹⁴ For example, the “European region” is supposed to represent such a multilayered system where countries are governed by international law, EU law, regional law, and local laws (*ibid.*, p. 76). Yet, rather than offering an independent definition of globalisation and testing to see if the EU meets the criteria; for Held and McGrew, the EU both defines globalisation and represents the effects of globalisation (1999, pp. 72-80). In effect, Held and McGrew are arguing that $b \leftrightarrow c$ (namely that these organisational interests are defined as globalisation). Such a failure occurs because the authors replace strict definition with ambiguous language. In discussing political globalisation, they use a highly abstract language, claiming that “contemporary globalization is associated with a transformation of state power as the roles and functions of states are re-articulated, reconstituted and re-embedded at the intersection of globalizing and regionalising networks and systems” creating “overlapping communities of fate” (Held and McGrew, 2001). One could replace the word “globalization” with the phrase “political globalisation,” “technology,” or even “international development” in this last quote and still arrive at the same meaning -- or lack of meaning. Logically, they have failed to define c and show how $b \rightarrow c$.

¹³ Perhaps the only author reviewed which does describe concrete ways that globalisation affects political interests is Rodrik (1997) who notes that globalisation affects social relationships through the transformation of employment relationships, creation of conflicts between international trade and local norms, and the generation of pressure on welfare systems.

¹⁴ This political structure has been developed by Held and Archibugi (1995) under the name of “cosmopolitan democracy”. In particular, cosmopolitan democracy entails a system of governance arising from and adapting to the diverse conditions and interconnections between different peoples and nations. For these authors, the UN charter represents this type of democracy where different conceptions and layers of governance exist simultaneously

6. Conclusion

How is the politics of globalisation being theorised? In Held and McGrew's formulation, globalisation (*a*) supposedly causes changes in the relations between organisations holding political power (*b*) thereby resulting in the "shifting reach of political power, authority and forms of rule" (*c*). In symbols, this can be expressed as $a \rightarrow b \rightarrow c$. However, Held and McGrew fail to define globalisation through misrepresenting the hyper-globalist and sceptic theories of globalisation. After such a misrepresentation, they proceed to define the ambiguous noun "globalisation" using ambiguous characteristics such as its "extensivity" and "velocity." Thus, globalisation (*a*) is left ill-defined. Because they fail to show how globalisation affects organisational interests (represented as *b* whose elements may include MNEs, IGOs, regional trading blocs or national governments) and because they leave out other important organisations (such as national governments, sub-national governments, and national business interests), then it is not possible to establish the relationship between globalisation and organisational interests --thus $a \rightarrow b$ is false. Finally, Held and McGrew fail to define political globalisation (represented as *c*); again replacing the phrase "political globalisation" with other ill-defined phrases such as "multi-layered governance." Because neither organisational interests, nor political globalisation are defined; and because no causal links were established to prove that organisational interests (such as local UN agencies, IGOs or MNEs) affected the "shifting reach of political power, authority and forms of rule", it follows that $b \rightarrow c$ is also false given Held and McGrew's argument.

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